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ABSTRACT 
This paper proposes a framework for agents in globally collaborative supply chain by applying the concept of coalition 
formation, a cooperation game in game theory. This framework provides mutual benefits to every party involved buyers, 
sellers and logistics providers. It provides a common gateway that allows individual parties to locate the right partners, 
negotiate with them, and form coalition in the best possible ways. The framework is applicable to real world e-business 
models, including B2C, B2B, supply chain and logistics, SME, etc. We firstly discuss common needs existing in today 
e-business. We then discuss about our framework, i.e., negotiation protocol and decision mechanism.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The current business environment is characterized by 
large complex supply chains that are often global in 
reach and that are highly adaptive, being frequently 
re-configured to respond to dynamic business contexts. 
It is widely recognized collaboration across the supply 
chain is a key prerequisite for supply chain efficiency. 
The effective deployment of information technology 
and systems, specially the Internet and the worldwide 
web, has made new modes of complex, dynamic yet 
effective collaboration possible across supply chains. 
Collaboration in supply chains can take various forms. 
Suppliers and buyers might collaborate to increase 
buying/selling power, to reduce logistics costs or to 
aggregate capacity. The problem of determining an 
optimal set of collaborative arrangements/agreements 
for a given firm can be complex. This research seeks to 
develop automated (or semi-automated) negotiation 
protocols as a basis for building decision support 
functionality for dealing with this complexity. 
 
The coalition formation problem ([4], [9]) considers 
techniques and criteria that might be used by a 
collection of (rational) agents to decide how they might 
group together to improve individual or social utility. 
Coalitions are ubiquitous in real-life settings. The 
theoretical underpinnings of approaches to coalition 
formation lie in the literature on multi-player games in 
game theory ([9]). Players negotiate among themselves 
about payoffs to decide which coalition to join. In 
reality, it is more complex than that. Self-interested 
agents, operating in dynamic environment such as 
supply chain, are under heterogeneous constraints. 
Furthermore, each agent has its own strategies that 
increase or decrease the value of each constraint thus 
affects the decision making of agents. A simple example 
of this is one is using express mail service, which costs 
more, due to a deadline while another is using ordinary 
mail service, which costs less, with further deadline. 
While time is changing in dynamic environment, the 
value of a constraint varies thus affecting the utility of 
the agent. In contrast to traditional coalition formation 
study, where the coalition value is predefined and 
thoroughly known among agents, an agent has to 
calculate, according to its constraints and strategies, for 
the coalition that would give it maximum utility. We 
believe that two of the key components of successful 
coalition formation of self-interested agents are, one, 
quickly negotiating with other agents and, two, selecting 
the best possible coalition. Each agent, bounded by its 
own constraints, may negotiate with others to form a 
coalition, which is likely to yield maximum benefit. 
Such a coalition, however, may not be formed due to the 
constraints. So the agent has to look for the next best 
possible coalition by consulting with its internal utility 
mechanism. Negotiation and decision must be done in a 
timely fashion. There are works in coalition formation 
that discuss the formation of buyers, sellers and LPs 
separately. This work provides a basic framework that 
allows thorough collaboration among agents in supply 
chain. It includes two important components: a 
negotiation protocol and a decision mechanism. The 
negotiation protocol allows agents to exchange 
necessary information before deciding which coalition 
to join. A coalition can be as complex as a coalition of 
buyers, sellers and LPs. We restrict attention to 
traditional supply chain activities for the sake of 
simplicity. Our focus is primarily on material flows, 
but note that many of the concepts developed in this 
work could apply equally well to these other forms of 
collaboration. 
 
2. COLLABORATION IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
 
As discussed earlier, our focus in this paper is to 
develop coalition formation techniques that are 
appropriate to large, complex supply chains. In our 
domain, we can conceive of three categories of 
actors/agents: buyers, sellers and logistics providers 
(LPs). In this view, a logistics provider is any 
organization that provides transportation, warehousing 
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or other logistics-related services. A firm (buyer or 
seller) has a set of plans to produce goods. Each plan 
consists of multiple activities, which may be of two 
types: external and internal. External activities are those 
that involve with i) procuring raw materials from 
external suppliers and ii) transporting the raw materials 
from the suppliers’ warehouses to appropriate 
manufacturing sites. Internal activities are those that 
deploy internal resources of the firms (e.g., in-house 
manufacturing, assembly etc.). These activities are often 
required to satisfy synchronization/scheduling 
constraints, and there are penalties associated with the 
violation of these constraints. In addition to these 
constraints, each agent/actor seeks to satisfy several 
(internal) objectives, e.g. buying the raw materials at the 
affordable prices, with acceptable quality etc. In modern 
web-enabled supply chains, the process of matching 
buyers with sellers (of goods or services) is often 
facilitated by online e-marketplaces. Our framework 
assumes the existence of multiple such e-markets, where 
sellers advertise their product or service offerings while 
buyers advertise their requirements. There are many 
different motivating factors that make firms collaborate. 
In other words, there are multiple distinct drivers for 
coalition formation.  
 
The simplest form of a supply chain coalition is one 
where a buyer forms a coalition with a seller and an LP 
to satisfy one of the external activities in a plan (e.g. to 
supply and deliver a manufacturing input to a 
production process). Buyers sometimes form coalitions 
with other buyers for the purpose of buy-side 
aggregation, i.e., the aggregation of buying power. 
Sellers sometimes form coalitions with other sellers to 
aggregate selling power. Such coalitions are common 
for small sellers, such as in agricultural cooperatives 
(e.g. for micro-producers of dairy products). Logistics 
provider (LPs) may want to form coalitions to aggregate 
their service capacities. We note that we have only 
listed the basic drivers. Most real-life supply chain 
coalitions tend to have more than one motivating factor 
driving their formation. Thus a coalition consisting of 
several sellers and several LPs might be driven by the 
need to aggregate selling power (for the sellers), the 
need to aggregate production capabilities (again for the 
sellers) and the need to offer comprehensive production 
and delivery contracts (thus bringing in one or more LPs 
into the coalition). We also note agents/actors (i.e., 
buyers, sellers or LPs) could participate in more than 
one coalition at any given point in time. Thus a seller 
might participate in a coalition with other sellers to 
aggregate selling power, while simultaneously 
participating in a coalition with a different set of sellers 
in order aggregate manufacturing capabilities. 
   
Both quantitative and qualitative factors play a role in 
coalition formation decisions. Price, delivery cost and 
lead time are examples of the former while quality, 
satisfaction and trust are examples of the latter. In the 
current work, we focus on four key criteria - cost, lead 
time, quality and trust - while acknowledging that other 
criteria might be relevant (though possibly less 
important). Cost is the sum of price and delivery cost. 
Lead time is the time elapsed between an order being 
placed and the good or service becoming available.  
Trust is usually taken to denote the degree of belief of 
an actor/agent that another actor/agent will live up to its 
commitments. These attributes are not orthogonal, and 
most decisions typically involve trade-offs between 
them. One may be willing to pay more for a shorter lead 
time (or higher quality or higher trust/reliability) and 
vice versa.  One may, in some settings, be willing to 
accept longer lead times for the purpose of getting 
higher quality. Several other instances of such trade-off 
are common, but we do not list them all here. Although 
negotiation can be either bilateral or multilateral, we can 
in most instances reduce negotiation to the bilateral case 
without loss of generality. The simplest scenario is 
where single agents negotiate, e.g., a buyer with a seller 
and a buyer with an LP. A buyer can bilaterally 
negotiate with multiple sellers/LPs at the same time in 
order to find the best pair of a seller and an LP. The 
information exchanged is kept private to each agent. A 
more complex scenario is where multiple agents 
negotiate. An agent that stands to benefit the most from 
forming a coalition usually acts as the coalition leader. A 
coalition leader negotiates bilaterally with multiple 
agents of its own type (buyer, seller or LP) to establish a 
sectoral coalition, i.e., a coalition of buyers, or a 
coalition of sellers, or LPs etc. The object of such 
negotiation is usually to establish how the coalition 
value, i.e., the financial benefits of collaboration might 
be distributed across the members of the coalition.  
 
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR SUPPLY CHAIN 
COALITION FORMATION 
 
In our model, the agents are divided in three 
groups— the set B = {B1, B2,… , Bi} of buyers, the set S 
= {S1, S2, … , Sj} of sellers, and the set L = {L1, L2,… , 
Lk} of LPs. The set LOC = {loc1, loc2,… , locm} is a set 
of locations where sellers’ manufacturing facilities or 
warehouses and buyers’ sites are located. The set G = 
{G1, G2,… , Gn} is a set of goods. Each good g is 
associated with a load belonging to the set LD = {LD1, 
LD2,… , LDo}, where a load is defined by either weight 
or volume. The notion of a load as distinct from a good 
becomes relevant in the context of negotiation with LPs. 
The sets LOC, G and LD are common knowledge to all 
agents. We will assume that each agent (whether a 
buyer, seller or LP) has access to the following: 1) A 
history of the prior coalitions that the agent has 
participated in. 2) A history of what has transpired in 
the current round of negotiation. 3) An operations 
management system. In the instance of buyers and 
sellers, these would essentially be some form of 
production scheduling and optimization system. For LPs, 
these would be some form of logistics optimization 
system. The intent is to be able to query the system to 
obtain quotes that would be used in the process of 
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negotiation. Thus a seller should be able to query the 
operations management system by providing the 
product requirements and the date/time by which the 
product must be ready (typically a shipping deadline) to 
obtain a price quote. This quoted price is typically 
higher for early shipping deadlines (i.e. rush orders) and 
vice versa. Similarly, an LP should be able to query 
such a system with details on the loads, origin, 
destination and delivery deadlines to obtain a price 
quote to use in negotiation. Once again, rush orders are 
likely to result in higher price quotes and vice versa. An 
operations management system is assumed to have 
access to real-time data about the firm’s current 
business context, and thus provides highly 
context-sensitive output. We do not discuss the design 
and implementation of such systems, but note that most 
firms (especially larger ones) tend to employ some 
version of these systems. 
 
In the following, we present a simple negotiation 
protocol to support coalition formation. We first 
describe some basic assumptions made by the protocol. 
A message containing fields set to null is treated as a 
query. An agent replies to a query with an offer made by 
filling the null fields of the query with proposed values. 
Agents negotiate by modifying the values of the 
received offers and sending them back. Agents accept 
offers by sending acknowledge messages. When a deal 
is done, agents are obliged to discharge their 
commitments. 
 
3.1 Buyer to Seller and Buyer to LP Negotiation 
 
Direction Message 
B®S B2S(msg#, buyer, good, totalquantity, quality, 
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price,  expirytime) 
B¬S S2B(msg#, seller, good, quality, (availabletime, origin, 
quantity), price,  expirytime) 
B®S B2Sack(msg#) 
B¬S S2Back(msg#) 
B®L B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
B¬L L2B(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
B®L B2Lack(msg#) 
B¬L L2Back(msg#) 
Note: B is the buyer, S is the seller and L is the LP. 
 
Table 1: Buyers’ negotiation messages with sellers over 
buying goods and with LP over delivering goods. 
 
The buyer begins negotiation by sending a message 
B2S(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, origin, 
quantity), price, expirytime) to sellers asking for a quote 
for totalquantity units of the good.  (availabletime, 
origin, quantity) is a list of triples, each of which 
specifies that a certain quantity of the good needs to be 
picked up from origin at availabletime. If the buyer is 
contacting the seller for the first time or wants an 
updated quote, availabletime, origin, quantity and price 
are set to null (i.e., the buyer does not wish to 
pre-specify an available-time, the exact location the 
good is to be sourced from, the quantity to be sourced 
from that location and the price the seller may wish to 
offer). In subsequent messages from the buyer to the 
seller, the (availabletime, origin, quantity) triples may 
have non-null values. This is because the seller would 
have replied to the buyer with a similar list of tuples 
(see below) indicating that the seller would be able to 
meet the order by sourcing production from multiple 
locations with distinct available times. The expirytime 
provides the seller with a deadline within which it must 
reply – otherwise the request will be deemed to have 
expired. Upon receiving the message, each seller 
consults its operations management system, retrieves 
the price quote and available time, then replies to the 
buyer with the message S2B(msg#, seller, good, quality, 
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price,  expirytime), 
indicating that the seller will be able to offer the good, 
at a specific price, ready at origin on availabletime. The 
offer lasts for expirytime (in case the seller is not in a 
position to supply the good, it will not reply). If the 
buyer is satisfied with the offer, it will send the message 
B2Sack(msg#) back to the seller. Once the seller 
receives it, the deal is done— the buyer is obliged to pay 
money and the seller has to supply the good. If the 
buyer is not satisfied with the price, it negotiates on the 
price by sending the message B2S(msg#, buyer, good, 
quality, (availabletime, origin, quantity), price, 
expirytime) with the new price back to the seller again. 
If the seller is satisfied with it, it will send the message 
S2BAck(msg#) back to buyer in order to seal the deal. 
 
At the same time, the buyer also contacts one or more 
LPs to organize shipping of the product. It sends the 
message B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, 
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
to LPs. The (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime) is a list of packaging tuples, 
each of which specifies that there are quantity of loads 
to be picked up from origin at pickuptime and to be 
delivered to destination at arrivaltime. For the first 
message from a buyer to an LP, or when the buyer seeks 
an updated quote, the cost will be set to null. Upon 
receiving the message, the LP consults its operations 
management system to compute the cost of the delivery 
job. It then sends the quote to the buyer with the 
message L2B(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, 
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime). 
The quote will last for expirytime. If the buyer is 
satisfied with the quote, it finalises the deal by sending 
the message B2LAck(msg#) back to the LP. If the buyer 
seeks to make a counter-offer to an LP, it will set load, 
quantity, origin, destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime 
and cost to its desired values. It then sends a message 
B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) to the LP. If 
the LP is happy with it, it will reply with the message 
L2BAck(msg#). Both buyer and LP are now contracted. 
  
3.2 Decision Mechanism 
 
At the top level, buyers have to obey a set of criteria in 
order to make decisions about their external activities. 
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We modify multi-attribute decision making scheme 
proposed by Keeney and Raiffa ([7]). Instead of having 
a fixed weight attached to each attribute, we propose to 
have a dynamic weight table for each attribute. The 
dynamic weight table associates a set of weights with a 
number of environment conditions in one-to-one 
manner. The environment conditions are the facts, 
which affect the weight, or importance, of an attribute. 
For example, the weight for time and price are equal to 
1 in normal situation. In the face of a shortage of a raw 
material, the weight of time is 10 times more than that 
of the price. The environment conditions can be 
achieved from internal or external sources. They can be 
in form of relation among attributes and facts. Therefore, 
the near optimal is acceptable to experienced agents 
who know how to make good profit in the long run.  
 
 
Each agent maintains the strategic weight table, which 
counsels the agent a value of the weight of an attribute 
under a certain condition. The weight of an attribute is 
in a range of integer numbers. The agent controls values 
of the lower and upper bounds. A condition change can 
be a stock shortage, a financial concern, a complaint 
from customer, or a combination of them. An agent 
learns from its experience that how the changing 
environment affects its business and how to react. The 
results of the reactions will be analysed by the agent and 
it will update the range of the weights and their values 
under such conditions. It specifies in the table about a 
certain condition Xp expressively. Each attribute aq 
affected by the condition Xp will be assigned a specific 
weight wiq to it. For example, when “there is a stock 
shortage of a raw material g” (good g Î G), the weight 
of the attribute “price” under this condition will be 
decreased while the weight of lead time will be 
increased. The agent updates its strategic weight table 
every time it senses a change in environment. This 
allows agent to act wisely in dynamic environment. 
Among the four attributes, trust is a special decision 
criterion in the sense that it depends on other attributes 
such as time and quality promised by other agents. 
Agents maintain trust differently. Each buyer has a trust 
table keeping record of other agents, including other 
buyers, sellers and LPs, and their trusted values. Each 
agent in the trust agent is associated with an integer 
value from range [-1,1]. The value is updated over times. 
When a buyer is dealing with a new agent, it may give a 
low value to trust, e.g. 0.3 or 0.4 to the new agent. If the 
agent performs well, e.g., keeps up with schedule, 
provide high quality of good, etc., the buyer increases 
trust value for that agent. On the other hand, if an agent 
fails to keep up with its promise, the buyer decreases the 
trust value. All the offers made by sellers and LPs are 
kept in buyers’ knowledge base. Whenever it needs to 
compute the utility, it checks for the current 
environment condition Xp and take the corresponding 
weight wpq of each attribute aq. It creates a new tuple 
(msg#, agent) for each active offer and create a new 
ranking table composed of three fields: sellers’ offer 
(msg#, agent), LPs’ offers (msg#, agent) and å aqwqp. 
The first two fields are merely reference to the exact 
offers. The third field is the utility for each combination 
of sellers and LPs offers. The agent computes the utility 
for each combination by combining utility of the seller’s 
offer and that of the LP’s offer. The utility of an offer 
can be achieved by å aqwqp, where aq is the attribute 
value retrieved from the corresponding offer, and wpq is 
the weight of the attribute aq under condition Xp. 
 
3.3 Buyer to Buyer Negotiation 
 
Direction Message 
Bl®Bm Bl2Bm(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, origin, 
quantity), price, expirytime) 
Bl¬Bm Bm2Bl(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, origin, 
quantity), price, expirytime) 
Bl®Bm Bl2BmDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
Bl¬Bm Bm2BlDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
Bl®Bm Bl2BmAck(msg#) 
Bl¬Bm Bm2BlAck(msg#) 
Bl®Bm Bl2BmDelAck(msg#) 
Bl¬Bm Bm2BlDelAck(msg#) 
Note: Bl is the leading buyer, Bm is a member buyer. 
 
Table 2: Buyers’ negotiation messages on buying goods. 
 
Buyers can form coalition to share discount on prices 
and delivery costs. A buyer can join any appropriate 
coalition. A buyer can join a coalition for discount on 
price and join another coalition for saving delivery cost. 
This allows agents to maximise benefits freely. When a 
buyer wants to form a coalition of buyers, it becomes a 
leading buyer, who tries to negotiate among buyers to 
form a buying coalition then negotiates on behalf of the 
coalition to agree on the prices with sellers. Firstly, the 
leading agent consults with its knowledge about other 
buyers who might be interested. Agents are considered 
being interested if i) they used to buy the same good at 
around this time previously, ii) they are located nearby, 
or iii) randomly selected. The leading agent sends the 
message Bl2Bm(msg#, buyer, good, quality, 
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime) with 
value of origin, quantity and price set to null to all 
interested agents. The interested agents consider the 
invitation and if they find that they are in need of the 
same good of the same quality at availabletime, they 
will reply by sending the message Bm2Bl(msg#, buyer, 
good, quality, (availabletime, origin, quantity), price, 
  Strategic weight 
Condition Attribute Weight 
X1 a1 w11 
X2 a1 w12 
X1 a2 w21 
X2 a2 w22  
U = å aqwqp Where 
condition Xp holds 
 
Buyer’s ranking table 
Sellers’ offers LPs’ offers å aqwqp 
(msg1, S1) (msg7, L7) å aqS1wqp +å aqLywqp 
(msg2, S1) (msg8, L8) å aqS1wqp +å aqL8wqp 
(msg3, S2) (msg9, L8) å aqS2wqp +å aqL8wqp  
 
Figure 1: Strategic weight table, utility calculation and ranking 
for the best combination of seller and LP. 
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expirytime) with the quantity set to an appropriate value 
back to the leading buyer. After the expiry time, the 
leading buyer assumes that all the truly interested 
buyers have responded. It then sums up all the quantitys 
and sends the message B2S(msg#, buyer, good, quality, 
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price,  expirytime) to 
sellers. The sellers will reply with the message 
S2B(msg#, seller, good, quality, (availabletime, origin, 
quantity), price,  expirytime).  
 
Upon receiving quotes from sellers, the leading buyer 
select the one with maximal utility, computed the same 
way discussed above. It then computes the price for 
each interested agents. Then the leading agent sends the 
message Bl2Bm(msg#, buyer, good, quality, 
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price, expirytime) to 
interested agents. If the all interested agents agree, they 
send the message Bm2BlAck(msg#) and the coalition is 
formed. If any of them is not satisfied with the share, 
they may negotiate on the price by sending message 
Bm2Bl(msg#, buyer, good, quality, (availabletime, 
origin, quantity), price, expirytime). The leading buyer 
may try to satisfy the demanding buyers by giving away 
its share on the discount (Kraus et al., 2004) up to a 
limit. Whenever it goes beyond that, the leading buyer 
send the message B2S(msg#, buyer, good, quality, 
(availabletime, origin, quantity), price,  expirytime) 
with the price increased by the excess to the seller. If the 
seller accepts it, the leading buyer sends the 
Bl2BmAck(msg#) to all members. The buying coalition 
is now formed. All members are obliged to pay the bills. 
If the seller does not accept, the negotiation goes on, 
virtually similar to that between a single buyer to a 
single seller. If the time runs out, then all of them suffer 
loosing opportunity. 
 
Any buyer can try to manage transportation for other 
agents. Those agents may have been already interested 
in buying within the same buying coalition or may be 
located nearby. The process is similar to forming buying 
coalition. The leading buyer sends message 
Bl2BmDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, 
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
with load, quantity and cost set to null to all interested 
agents. The recipient agents consider if the origin, 
destination, pickuptime, and arrivaltime are suitable 
with their plans. The interested agents sent message 
Bm2BlDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, 
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
with (load, quantity, origin, destination, pickuptime, 
arrivaltime) and cost set to appropriate values back to 
the leading buyer. The leading buyer collects all replies 
and send message B2L(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, 
origin, destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, 
expirytime) with (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime) set to all members’ requests 
and cost set to null to LPs. The LPs reply with message 
L2B(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) with cost set 
to appropriate value. The leading buyer computes for 
the best offer and compute for the cost for each 
interested agent. It then sends to interested agents the 
message Bl2BmDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, 
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
with cost set to their costs. If all the interested agents are 
happy with their costs, they reply with message 
Bm2BlDelAck(msg#). The leading buyer sends the 
acknowledge message to the LP. The deal is done. If the 
interested agents are not satisfied with their costs, they 
negotiate with the leading agent by sending message 
Bm2BlDel(msg#, buyer, (load, quantity, origin, 
destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
with their preferred costs. The leading agent can try to 
negotiate with the unhappy buyers by giving away its 
share on the saved cost up to a threshold. If the 
demanding goes beyond the threshold, the leading buyer 
negotiates with the LP. The process repeats backward 
and forward until every agent is satisfied or the time 
expires. 
 
3.4 Seller to Seller and LP to LP Negotiation 
 
Sellers can form coalition when appropriate. Once a 
seller receives a quote it considers out of its resources or 
considers outsourcing is beneficial, it negotiates with 
other sellers. It firstly consults with its own plan for its 
capability and consults with its knowledge base for 
outsourcing to other sellers. It computes for other 
sellers’ share on goods and prices. It sends message 
Sl2Sm(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime, 
quantity, price, expirytime) with price set to null to 
other sellers who can mutually cover the outsourcing. 
The recipients reply with the prices-quoted message 
Sm2Sl(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime, 
quantity, price, expirytime). If the leading seller is 
satisfied with all quotes, its finalises the deals with other 
agents by sending message Sl2SmAck(msg#). If it is not 
satisfied with any of them, it can negotiate, similarly to 
how the leading buyer does it. Once all of the 
unsatisfied agents agree, they accept by sending 
message Sm2SlAck(msg#) back to the leader. Then the 
deal is done.  
 
Direction Message 
Sl®Sm Sl2Sm(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime, quantity, 
price, expirytime) 
Sl¬Sm Sm2Sl(msg#, seller, good, quality, availabletime, quantity, 
price, expirytime) 
Ll®Lm Ll2Lm(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
Ll¬Lm Lm2Ll(msg#, LP, (load, quantity, origin, destination, 
pickuptime, arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) 
Sl®Sm Sl2SmAck(msg#) 
Sl¬Sm Sm2SlAck(msg#) 
Ll®Lm Ll2LmAck(msg#) 
Ll¬Lm Lm2LlAck(msg#) 
Note: Sl is the leading seller, Sm is a member seller. Ll is 
leading LP, Lm is member LP. 
 
Table 3: Sellers’ negotiation messages over selling goods and 
LPs’ negotiation messages over delivery jobs. 
 
When contacted from either a buyer or a seller, an LP 
may form coalition with others when it does not have 
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enough resources or it finds that forming coalition is 
more profitable. The leading LP may divide whole 
distribution area into sections and decide to bilaterally 
negotiate with LPs, each of which is considered having 
enough potential to distribute the good on assigned 
section. The leading LP sends message Ll2Lm(msg#, LP, 
(load, quantity, origin, destination, pickuptime, 
arrivaltime), cost, expirytime) with (load, quantity, 
origin, destination, pickuptime, arrivaltime) set to 
calculated values to potential agents. Each member 
agent tries to accommodate the on-negotiating job with 
its own resources and its on-going plans. If the member 
is satisfied with the offer, it sends message 
Lm2LlAck(msg#) back to the leading LP— the deal is 
done. If not, it negotiates with the leading LP similar to 
buyers and sellers. Some LPs may not be satisfied with 
bilateral negotiation, they may force the leading LP to 
manage the multilateral negotiation for the sake of 
fairness and efficiency. LP negotiation is concerned 
with the cost of doing the job and the profit. The cost is 
involved with the route a LP run regularly and the route 
for the new job. 
 
4. RELATED WORK 
 
Coalition formation is an active research area in 
multi-agent systems. Previous work has done some part 
of our proposing framework as the followings. Li et al. 
([8]) addressed the combinatorial auction in coalition 
formation. Buyers submit their requests to the mediator 
who will allocate the good from sellers to them. 
Goldman et al. ([2]) searched for a strategy where 
sellers selected the most profitable deal while buyers 
looked for the most satisfiable sellers. Kraus et al. ([6]) 
proposed a compromise strategy for distributing profits 
among sellers in order to form coalition quickly. They 
found that agents who are willing to give away their 
profits actually earn more. Breban et al. ([1]) addressed 
the coalition formation based on trust among agents. 
Trust is used as a mechanism to enforce agents to 
commit themselves to the jobs as parts of the coalition. 
Hyodo et al. ([3]) addressed the optimal coalitions of 
buyers and sellers who are located in distributed sites. 
They deploy genetic algorithm to search for the optimal 
share over the discount. Klusch et al. ([5]) addressed 
problems in static coalition formation and proposed an 
algorithm for mobile agents to form coalition under 
dynamic environment. Agents can form overlapping 
coalitions.  
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
We propose a simple framework, which involves 
negotiation protocol and decision mechanism. The 
negotiation protocol allows thorough communication, 
i.e., buyers to buyers, buyers to sellers, sellers to sellers, 
buyer to LPs, and LPs to LPs. The decision mechanism 
is a modification of Keeney et al.’s ([7]), which allows 
agents to adapt its decision to suit with changing 
environment. Agents can select appropriate weights for 
the environment in order to make suitable decision. The 
traditional utility-based decision mechanism seems 
inadequate in complex settings in real world. New 
approaches, e.g., Markov decision processes, Bayesian 
networks, CPNets, are suitable for more complex and 
dynamic environment. Under uncertain environment, 
agents have to learn from the past and project it to 
forecast what will happen in the future. Efficient 
utilization of knowledge base should help agents 
perform better in dynamic coalition formation. Based on 
this framework, we want to develop agents who are able 
to evolve strategies in order to enhance cooperation. In 
stead of modeling supply chain competitive games, we 
want to explore that under changing environment, how 
agents can adapt their strategies to cooperate and be 
successful at the end. 
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